Abstract
When does giving managers more decision rights protect organizations from losing their key people? Drawing on digital options theory and IS governance research, we argue that operational discretion acts as insurance: dormant under routine conditions but activated under environmental stress. We test this with a natural experiment in professional football. In 2022/23, the English Premier League expanded in-game substitution rights from three to five, while other Big-5 leagues had already adopted this rule. Using a difference-in-differences design across 586 team-seasons, expanded discretion shows no average effect on extreme injury burden under routine conditions; under high schedule congestion, however, the protective effect is large and significant: 367 fewer days lost to severe injuries. Managers actively exercised additional rights. Because the Premier League is one treated unit, findings are suggestive quasi-experimental evidence. Results are consistent with digital options theory: decision rights function as contingent options whose protective value activates under stress.